Joint Position of Business Community Organizations in Albania regarding the Draft Law “On the National Economic Chamber”
The business community organizations in Albania highly value the importance of a structured institutional dialogue between enterprises and public institutions, as well as any effort aimed at improving representation, services, and support for businesses. In this spirit, we have reviewed the re‑proposed version of the Draft Law “On the National Economic Chamber,” published for public consultation on August 14, 2026, together with its explanatory memorandum.
Despite the revision of the draft and the changes reflected in the latest version, we consider that the main concerns raised by the business community remain valid. In particular, several fundamental issues continue to require proper addressing, including the model of mandatory membership, the content and tangible value of the services to be offered to businesses, as well as the need for a comprehensive and well‑reasoned analysis that justifies the necessity and proportionality of the proposed reform.
1. Mandatory Membership and Freedom of Enterprise and Association
The draft law continues to stipulate that every commercial entity with active status in the Commercial Register becomes a member of the National Economic Chamber “ipso lege”. The exceptions provided under Article 11 mainly concern categories of entities which, due to the nature of their activity, are subject to mandatory registration or membership in chambers or professional organizations established by special law. Consequently, these exceptions do not alter the fundamental principle on which the proposed system is built: mandatory membership in the National Economic Chamber for commercial entities falling within the scope of the law.
We consider that this model should be reviewed from the perspective of economic freedom and freedom of association. Business representation functions effectively when it is built upon trust, choice, and the value that the respective organization offers to its members. Every business should have the freedom to decide whether it wishes to join a business chamber and, if so, in which organization it prefers to be represented, depending on its interests, sector, profile, and needs.
The existence of voluntary business organizations, including bilateral and multilateral chambers, sectoral associations, investors’ organizations, and other representative bodies, is part of the pluralism of entrepreneurial representation. These organizations have been established on the basis of voluntary membership, and their legitimacy derives from the choice of their members. For this reason, the creation by law of a national structure with automatic membership should not replace, weaken, or condition their role, undermine the autonomy of existing organizations, or restrict the establishment and functioning of new voluntary organizations. Likewise, membership prescribed by law cannot grant the National Economic Chamber a monopoly or privileged status in representing business and in dialogue with institutions. The state may establish an institution by law and delegate to it public functions; however, the mandate to represent business can only be conferred by business itself.
2. Member services and the relationship between financial obligation, concrete benefit, and the free will to receive services.
The revised version of the draft law foresees a broader range of functions and services for the National Economic Chamber, including business advisory, training, surveys and analyses, support for registrations, certificates of origin, ATA/TIR Carnet, the role in the European integration of enterprises, promotion of exports and investments, as well as other delegated public functions.
This expansion is a development that should be taken into consideration. The definition of services and the corresponding fee do not, in itself, resolve the fundamental issue of mandatory membership. A financial obligation should not serve as a mechanism for the compulsory financing of a representative structure that business has not chosen.
This issue becomes particularly important since the draft law explicitly links the annual registration fee with the benefit of services and delegated public functions. To ensure proportionality, transparency, and a genuine value‑for‑contribution relationship, the law should clearly specify which basic services are included in the annual fee and guaranteed to all members, regardless of their size, sector, or location.
For this purpose, we recommend that the draft law should contain or explicitly mandate a minimum list of guaranteed basic services, where for each service at least the nature of the service, the category of beneficiaries, whether or not it is included in the annual fee, the minimum standard of provision, and the method of access are defined.
In this context, we also suggest clarifying the relationship between the annual registration fee, specific service fees, and public funding of delegated functions, with the aim of enhancing transparency and predictability for businesses.
For clarity and legal certainty, we further recommend clarifying the relationship between “ipso lege” membership under Article 11 and registration with the National Economic Chamber under Article 12, as well as the nature of the “annual registration fee” linked to the latter.
Moreover, since non‑payment of the annual registration fee is expressly foreseen as an administrative offense, we suggest that the regime of liability and the essential elements of the sanction be clearly defined within the legal framework itself, in order to ensure legal certainty and predictability for the entities concerned.
Otherwise, there is a risk that the membership fee will be perceived merely as a formal obligation rather than as consideration for an identifiable package of services, thereby weakening the legitimacy and functionality of the new structure.
3. The need for a comprehensive analysis of the existing system and for an evidence-based reform
The explanatory report of the revised version identifies as issues the “fragmentation of the existing chamber system”, the lack of a centralized coordinating structure at the national level, and the need to strengthen institutional capacities. Such a fundamental change in the model of business representation should not be based on the presumption that the existing system is inadequate. The need for intervention, and especially for its mandatory elements, must be proven on the basis of data, the real needs of businesses, and analyzed alternatives.
This becomes particularly important given that the draft law explicitly links the annual registration fee with the benefit of services and delegated public functions. To guarantee proportionality, transparency, and a real relationship between contribution and value received, the law must clearly define which basic services are included in the annual fee, which are guaranteed to businesses, and which are optional and provided upon the business’s own choice. The mere existence of a service cannot, by itself, justify the obligation of every business to receive and finance it, regardless of whether it needs or wishes to use it.
In this context, we consider it essential to conduct and publish a comprehensive analysis of the current chamber and business representation system, assessing the performance and services of existing structures, the level of their use by businesses, the concrete problems identified and their causes, as well as the real needs of enterprises according to size, sector, and region.
The analysis should also examine possible reform alternatives, including improving the existing model without imposing mandatory membership, the costs of establishing and operating the new system, funding sources, the cost–benefit ratio for businesses, and the impact of the proposed model on existing voluntary organizations and the pluralism of representation.
In the absence of such an analysis, it cannot be taken for granted that the identified “fragmentation” constitutes a problem that necessarily requires institutional centralization, mandatory membership, and compulsory business financing. It must be demonstrated that the intended objectives cannot be achieved through less restrictive and more proportionate measures.
Likewise, the financial assessment should reflect the entire period of budgetary support foreseen by the draft law. The report refers to a preliminary cost of about 15.4 million ALL for a one-year transitional period, while the draft law foresees support from the state budget for up to two years. Before the financing of the structure is transferred to businesses through a mandatory fee, it must be clear how much the new system actually costs, what businesses will finance, and what concrete value they will receive in return.
4. Coherence with the EU Integration Process and the Need for a Stronger Justification of the Reform
Albania is currently in an intensive phase of the European Union integration process, where a considerable part of legal and institutional reforms are linked to legislative alignment, strengthening the market economy, competitiveness, and institutions that support entrepreneurship.
The explanatory memorandum explicitly clarifies that this draft law does not aim at direct alignment with a specific act of the acquis communautaire and does not constitute a transposition measure. This, in itself, does not render a national reform unjustified. However, precisely because the proposed change does not stem from a specific acquis obligation and entails a profound reorganization of the business representation system, the need for a comprehensive justification, based on evidence and analysis of alternatives, becomes even more important.
In this context, the memorandum should explain more clearly which concrete objectives of the integration process and of market economy development are supported by the proposed model; why these objectives specifically require a public entity with ipso lege membership; what alternative models have been considered; and how the proportionality of the intervention has been assessed in relation to the freedom of enterprise and association.
A general reference to the principles of the market economy, institutional dialogue, and European integration should not substitute for the concrete analysis that legitimizes the choice of the institutional model. For a reform of such importance, the link between the identified problem, the proposed solution, and the expected outcome must be clear, measurable, and verifiable.
5. Avoiding Institutional Parallelism and Clearly Defining Delegated Public Functions
Another issue requiring attention is the clear delineation of boundaries between the functions and services assigned to the National Economic Chamber and the competences currently exercised by public institutions. The draft law assigns to the Chamber a number of delegated public functions and services and foresees its interaction with the National Business Center, including in processes related to business registration and data administration. In this regard, it is important that the division of competences be clearly defined, so as to avoid institutional overlaps, parallel procedures, or the creation of additional administrative burdens for businesses.
The draft law already provides a list of delegated public functions and mechanisms of cooperation with the National Business Center. However, for each delegated function, the legal basis, division of responsibilities, final responsible institution, service standard, appeal mechanism, and financing method must be clearly established. The delegation of public functions should aim at simplifying the relationship between business and the administration, not at creating a new level of institutional intermediation.
In particular, we suggest further clarifying the division of roles between the National Economic Chamber and the National Business Center for processes related to the registration, classification, and administration of business data, by clearly identifying the institution that exercises decision‑making competence and bears ultimate responsibility, with the aim of avoiding parallel procedures or additional obligations for businesses.
For the sake of legal certainty, we also recommend harmonizing Article 8, which foresees the possibility of delegating public competences also by agreement, with Article 9, which refers explicitly to delegation by law. In particular, for functions involving the exercise of public authority, the legal basis, limits, and corresponding responsibilities should be clearly established in the legal framework.
In the same spirit, it would be useful to clearly differentiate the representative and self‑regulatory functions of the National Economic Chamber from the delegated public administrative functions, including the oversight, liability, and financing regime applicable to each category.
Regarding the transitional period, while recognizing the need to ensure a smooth transition to the new system, we suggest that restrictions on the activity of existing chambers and cases requiring prior approval of the Temporary Technical Commission be defined and applied only to the extent necessary for managing the transition, without hindering the normal exercise of their activities until the completion of existing mandates.
Conclusions and Recommendations
Recognizing the changes and improvements made in the August 2026 version, the business community organizations consider that the fundamental issues raised in the previous joint position have not been fully resolved. In particular, the model of mandatory membership remains the key element that requires revision.
We recommend that the consultation process be used to reassess the model in its entirety, in order to ensure:
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- the genuine freedom of businesses to choose the manner and the organization through which they wish to be represented;
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- the protection of the autonomy and pluralism of existing and future voluntary business organizations;
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- a concrete and guaranteed list of basic services financed by the annual fee.
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- a comprehensive and published analysis of the current system, reform alternatives, and the economic and institutional impact of the proposed model;
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- a clearer justification of the reform’s coherence with the objectives of European integration and with the principles of the market economy, entrepreneurial freedom, proportionality, and freedom of association;
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- a clear delineation of delegated functions and the avoidance of overlaps with existing public institutions.
The consultation with the business community should serve to determine the model of the reform, and not merely to technically improve a pre‑determined model.
We remain committed to a constructive dialogue and available to further contribute to the improvement of the draft law.
Signatory Business Community Organizations:
American Chamber of Commerce (AMCHAM)
German Chamber of Commerce in Albania (DIHA)
Italian Chamber of Commerce in Albania (CCIA)
British Chamber of Commerce in Albania (BCCA)
Swiss–Albanian Chamber of Commerce (SWISSA)
Confindustria Albania – Association of Italian Industrialists in Albania
Foreign Investors Association of Albania (FIAA)
Albanian Association of Banks (AAB)
Hellenic Business Association of Albania (HBAA)
Albanian Renewable Energy Association (AREA)
“Albanian Trade Union” Association (BTSH)
Albanian Information Technology Association (AITA)
Albanian Insurance Association
Association of Life Insurers, Pensions and Investment Funds (SH.SJ.P.FI)
Albania–Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry (AJCCI)
Albanian E-Commerce Association (AECA)
France–Albania Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCIFA)